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1 Introduction
Hansen and Prescott (2002) and Sichel (1993) provide empirical evidence that positive shocks
produce smaller positive output effects than negative shocks produce negative output effects.
Elsewhere this has been explained using both capacity constraint models (Hansen and Prescott
2002; Danziger 2002; Danziger and Kreiner 2003) and sticky price models (Devereux and Siu
2003).3 In this note, we show that the state dependent pricing mechanism of Dotsey, King and
Wolman (1999) can explain this phenomenon, while time dependent pricing cannot. Further, for
sufficiently large shocks, state dependent pricing implies identical real responses to positive and
negative shocks.
2 The model
Consider a simple sticky price model with monopolistic competition in which the pricing
decision of firms is state dependent.
2.1 Firms
As in Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999), firms enjoy constant returns to scale technology, and
the real profit function of the firm in period t with price Pˆt−h is
pit−h,t =
(
Pˆt−h
Pt
)
−(
Pˆt−h − MCt
Pt
)
Ct (1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods.
Firms draw a lottery on the price adjustment cost ω from a distribution G(·) over a finite
support [0, ω¯] after the realization of shocks each period, where the price adjustment cost is
3Devereux and Siu (2003) assume that prices cannot remain fixed for more than two periods; in contrast, in
our model, the maximum number of periods for which prices remain fixed is endogenous.
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denominated in terms of output. Consider an individual firm that fixes its price for h periods.
Its real value function (after paying price adjustment costs) is given by
Vt−h,t = pit−h,t + βEt
[
αt−h,t+1Vt+1,t+1 + (1 − αt−h,t+1)Vt−h,t+1 − αt−h,t+1Ωt−h,t+1
]
(2)
where
Ωt−h,t+1 =
∫ G−1(αt−h,t+1)
0
xg(x)dx for h = 0, 1, · · · , J − 1 (3)
is the ex ante expected price adjustment cost in period t + 1 given that the price was last set in
period t − h, where g(x) is the density function of the price adjustment cost.
Iterating forward on the value functions and taking first order conditions,
Pˆt =

 − 1
Et
[ J−1∑
h=0
βhηt,t+hCt+hP
−1
t+h MCt+h
]
Et
[ J−1∑
h=0
βhηt,t+hCt+hP
−1
t+h
] (4)
is the price chosen by all adjusting firms where ηt,t+h is an individual firm’s conditional probability
that Pˆt holds in period t + h.
2.2 Aggregate demand
The aggregate output is given by the quantity equation
Yt = Ct + Ω¯t, (5)
where Ct =
Mt
Pt
and Ω¯t is the aggregate menu cost.
4
The nominal marginal cost facing each firm is the money supply,5
MCt = Mt, (6)
4Reported results are for Ω¯ =
∑
h θhΩh. Qualitatively, the results also hold if menu costs have no output
effects (Ω¯ = 0).
5MCt = Mt results from the utility function U(C,N) = ln(C) − N together with linear production in labor.
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which we assume follows the process
Mt = Mt−1(1 + µ)(1 + εt), (7)
where µ is the money growth rate chosen by the central bank and εt is white noise.
Aggregate prices are given by
Pt =
[
J∑
h=1
(
αt−h,tθt−h,tPˆ
1−
t + (1 − αt−h,t)θt−h,tPˆ
1−
t−h
] 1
1−
, (8)
where θt−h,t is the portion of firms whose price was fixed in period t−h and αt−h,t is the fraction
of firms who reset their price in period t after being fixed for h periods.
2.3 Solving the model
We consider parameter values similar to those used in other studies: β = 0.99;  = 11
(implying flexible-price mark-up of 10%); and µ = 3%. The price adjustment cost distribution
is calibrated to a uniform distribution with a maximum possible menu cost of 3.75% of steady
state output.
We first solve the non-stochastic steady state of the state dependent pricing model. Given
our calibration, in steady state J = 3, implying that we require solution values of four variables:
three values of α (one for each cohort of firms), and the real value of Pˆ (the price that adjusting
firms set). For arbitrary initial α’s we determine Pˆ , and then update the α’s repeatedly using
αt−h,t = G
−1
(
Vt,t − Vt−h,t
)
, a necessary condition for equilibrium, until they converge. We then
update Pˆ , and so on, until convergence, with a convergence criterion of 10−8. We then ensure
that our solution satisfies the sufficient conditions for equilibrium using a two-dimensional grid-
search over {α1, α2}.
6 We next include a shock and solve for the impulse response using the
6The sufficient condition for equilibrium is {αt,t+h}
J
h=1 = arg max Vt,t({αt−h,t}
J
h=1); see John and Wolman
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same approach, adding an additional dimension to the numerical problem, since α now depends
on both the cohort of the firm, and the time period. Note that we are solving the full non-
linear model numerically as in Burstein (2005), and so the results should be accurate up to our
convergence criterion, except for rounding errors.
We also compute results with a model of time dependent pricing, where the probability of
price adjustment at each horizon is taken to be the steady state probability.7
3 Results and Discussion
Figure 1 reports the response of the model in period 1, when the shock is realized, and
illustrates that the real effects of nominal shocks on output are very different with state dependent
pricing than with time dependent pricing. As in Devereux and Siu (2003), firms are more averse
to goods being underpriced than overpriced, since the maximum loss from over-pricing a good is
limited to making zero profits, while the maximum loss from under-pricing goods is potentially
unbounded. This effect is further exacerbated by positive trend inflation, since a price that is too
high today will depreciate with future inflation, while a price that is too low will only become
more so over time. Firms are therefore quicker to respond to positive than negative marginal
cost shocks. In our calibration, all firms increase prices in response to a 6% positive shock, while
it requires a much larger (16%) negative shock for all firms to cut prices. Thus output barely
rises in response to a positive nominal shock, while it may fall (by as much as 3%) in response
to a negative shock, in agreement with the empirical evidence outlined earlier.
(2004) for a discussion.
7This implies that αt−h,t is increasing in h. Similar results are obtained with Calvo (1983) pricing where
αt−h,t = 0.25 ∀h.
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In contrast, time dependent pricing implies that positive shocks result in larger real effects
than negative shocks. Adjusting firms only increase their prices a little in response to a positive
shock, but decrease their prices by more in response to a negative shock, due to competition
from firms that cannot adjust their prices. While these “strategic complementarity” effects are
also present with state dependent pricing, they are reduced since the number of adjusting firms
is highly responsive to the size of the shock.
Figures 2 and 3 report the impulse responses of output and inflation for different shock
sizes, ±1% and ±20%, for state dependent and time dependent pricing respectively. With state
dependent pricing, the output responses to large shocks are identical, irrespective of the sign
of the shock. This is because a sufficiently large shock induces all firms to adjust their prices
immediately, and given that expected future states are the same for all firms, they choose the
same real price regardless of the sign of the shock. In contrast, time dependent pricing implies
an increasing difference in the impulse responses of positive and negative shocks as shock size
increases.
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Figure 1. Same period responses to a shock.
——State Dependent Pricing; —.—Time Dependent Pricing
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Figure 2. Impulse responses to a 1% and a 20% shocks with state dependent pricing
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Inflation response to a 1% shock
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to a 1% and a 20% shocks with time dependent pricing
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